Visual representation of rational belief revision: Another look at the Sleeping Beauty Problem

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 5, Issue OCT, 2014, Pages

  Mandel, David R ^a  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Bayesian reasoning; Belief revision; Rationality; Sleeping Beauty problem; Visual representation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84907991240     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01232     Document Type: Article

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