The effects of mental steps and compatibility on Bayesian reasoning

Judgment and Decision Making

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 226-242

  Ayal, Shahar ^a   Beyth Marom, Ruth ^b  

^a INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER   (Israel)

^b OPEN UNIVERSITY OF ISRAEL   (Israel)

Author keywords

Bayesian reasoning; Compatibility; Conditional probabilities; Mental steps; Natural frequencies

Indexed keywords

EID: 84901676434     PISSN: 19302975     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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