Whose statistical reasoning is facilitated by a causal structure intervention?

Psychonomic Bulletin and Review

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 258-264

  McNair, Simon ^a   Feeney, Aidan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS   (United Kingdom)

^b QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY BELFAST   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Base rate neglect; Bayesian judgment; Causal reasoning; Numeracy

Indexed keywords

ADULT; APTITUDE; BAYES THEOREM; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; MALE; MATHEMATICAL PHENOMENA; PHYSIOLOGY; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING; THINKING; YOUNG ADULT;

ADULT; APTITUDE; BAYES THEOREM; FEMALE; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MALE; MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING; THINKING; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84926625642     PISSN: 10699384     EISSN: 15315320     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/s13423-014-0645-y     Document Type: Article

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