A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality

American Psychologist

Volumn 58, Issue 9, 2003, Pages 697-720

  Kahneman, Daniel ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; INTUITION; PERCEPTION; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; REVIEW;

COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; HUMANS; INTUITION; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PERCEPTION;

EID: 0242267471     PISSN: 0003066X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0003-066X.58.9.697     Document Type: Review

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