Controlled information integration and bayesian inference

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 6, Issue FEB, 2015, Pages

  Juslin, Peter ^a  

^a UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Base rate neglect; Bayesian inference; Linear additive integration; Probability reasoning; Working memory capacity

Indexed keywords

EID: 84926450945     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00070     Document Type: Note

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