Beyond the status-quo: Research on Bayesian reasoning must develop in both theory and method

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 6, Issue FEB, 2015, Pages

  McNair, Simon J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bayesian reasoning; Cognition; Individual differences; Psychological methods; Subjective probability

Indexed keywords

EID: 84926469005     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00097     Document Type: Article

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