Why does the base rate appear to be ignored? The equiprobability hypothesis

Psychonomic Bulletin and Review

Volumn 16, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 1065-1070

  Hattori, Masasi ^a   Nishida, Yutaka ^b  

^a RITSUMEIKAN UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b OSAKA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; ATTENTION; BAYES THEOREM; CONCEPT FORMATION; COUGHING; DECISION MAKING; DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS; HUMAN; INTUITION; LEARNING; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL;

ASSOCIATION LEARNING; ATTENTION; BAYES THEOREM; CONCEPT FORMATION; COUGH; DECISION MAKING; DIAGNOSIS, DIFFERENTIAL; HUMANS; INTUITION; JUDGMENT; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PROBABILITY LEARNING;

EID: 74849114770     PISSN: 10699384     EISSN: 15315320     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/PBR.16.6.1065     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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