When does information about causal structure improve statistical reasoning?

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

Volumn 67, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 625-645

  McNair, Simon ^a   Feeney, Aidan ^a  

^a QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY BELFAST   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Base rate neglect; Bayesian reasoning; Causality; Statistical reasoning

Indexed keywords

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; BAYES THEOREM; CASUISTRY; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; LEARNING; MALE; PROBLEM SOLVING; STATISTICAL MODEL; YOUNG ADULT;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; BAYES THEOREM; CASUISTRY; FEMALE; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MALE; MODELS, STATISTICAL; PROBABILITY LEARNING; PROBLEM SOLVING; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84897590968     PISSN: 17470218     EISSN: 17470226     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/17470218.2013.821709     Document Type: Article

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