Ecological rationality and evolution: the mind really works that way?

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 2, Issue SEP, 2011, Pages

  Navarrete, Gorka ^a   Santamaría, Carlos ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD DE LA LAGUNA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867118667     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00251     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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