Enhancing probabilistic reasoning: The role of causal graphs, statistical format and numerical skills

Learning and Individual Differences

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 187-196

  Tubau, Elisabet ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 42249114801     PISSN: 10416080     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.lindif.2007.08.006     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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