Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky

Cognition

Volumn 76, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 179-193

  Vranas, Peter B M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Concepts of probability; Frequentism; Heuristics and biases; Judgment under uncertainty; Norms of reasoning

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CALIBRATION; DECISION MAKING; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; STATISTICS;

BIAS (EPIDEMIOLOGY); COGNITION; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; LOGIC; PROBABILITY LEARNING;

EID: 0034648924     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0010-0277(99)00084-0     Document Type: Article

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