Evolutionary modules and Bayesian facilitation: The role of general cognitive resources

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 27-53

  Lesage, Elise ^a   Navarrete, Gorka ^b   de Neys, Wim ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSIDAD DE LA LAGUNA   (Spain)

^c Administrateur de l Institut universitaire de France   (France)

Author keywords

Bayesian facilitation; Cognitive capacity; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84876119023     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2012.713177     Document Type: Article

References (69)

1. Barbey, A. K. and Sloman, S. A. 2007. Base-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30: 241-254.
2. Barrett, H. C., Frederick, D. A., Haselton, M. G. and Kurzban, R. 2006. Can manipulations of cognitive load be used to test evolutionary hypotheses. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91: 513-518.
3. Barrett, H. C. and Kurzban, R. 2006. Modularity in cognition: framing the debate. Psychological review, 113: 628-647.
4. Barr-Hillel, M. 1980. The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments. Acta Psychologica, 44: 211-233.
5. Bethell-Fox, C. E. and Shepard, R. N. 1988. Mental rotation: Effects of stimulus complexity and familiarity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 14: 12-23.
6. Bonnefon, J. F., Hofensitz, A. and De Neys, W. Evidence for the modularity of trustworthiness detection in an economic game. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, (in press). doi: 10.1037/a0028930
7. Brase, G. L., Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. 1998. Individuals, counting, and statistical inference: The role of frequency and whole-object representations in judgment under uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 127: 3-21.
8. Borgida, E. and Brekke, N. 1981. "The base-rate fallacy in attribution and prediction". In New directions in attribution research, Edited by: Harvey, J. H., Ickes, W. J. and Kidd, R. F. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.
9. Carling, C. L. L., Kristoffersen, D. T., Montori, V. M., Herrin, J., Schunemann, H. J.Treweek, S. 2009. The effect of alternative summary statistics for communicating risk reduction on decisions about taking statins: A randomized trial. PLOS Medicine, 6(8): 10-1371.
10. Casscells, W., Schoenberger, A. and Grayboys, T. 1978. Interpretation by physicians of clinical laboratory results. New England Journal of Medicine, 299: 999-1000.
11. Chapman, G. B. and Liu, J. J. 2009. Numeracy, frequency, and Bayesian reasoning. Judgment and Decision Making, 4: 34-40.
12. Choi, S., Lotto, A., Lewis, D., Hoover, B. and Stelmachowicz, P. 2008. Attentional modulation of word recognition by children in a dual-task paradigm. Journal of Speech, Language and Hearing Research, 51: 1042-1054.
13. Colom, R., Rebollo, I., Palacios, A., Juan-Espinosa, M. and Kyllonen, P.C. 2004. Working memory is (almost) perfectly predicted by g. Intelligence, 32: 277-296.
14. Coltheart, M. 1999. Modularity and cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3: 115-120.
15. Cosmides, L., Barrett, H. C. and Tooby, J. 2010. Adaptive specialisations, social exchange and the evolution of human intelligence. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107: 9007-9014.
16. Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. 1994a. Beyond intuition and instinct blindness: Toward an evolutionarily rigorous cognitive science. Cognition, 50: 41-77.
17. Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. 1994b. Better than rational: Evolutionary psychology and the invisible hand. The American Economic Review, 84: 327-332.
18. Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. 1996. Are humans goods intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty. Cognition, 58: 1-73.
19. Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. 2008. "Can a general deontic logic capture the facts of human moral reasoning? How the mind interprets social exchange rules and detects cheaters". In Moral psychology, Edited by: Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 53-119. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
20. De Neys, W. 2006a. Dual processing in reasoning; two systems but one reasoner. Psychological Science, 17: 428-433.
21. De Neys, W. 2006b. Automatic-heuristic and executive-analytic processing during reasoning: Chronometric and dual-tasks considerations. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 59: 1070-1100.
22. De Neys, W. 2007. Nested sets and base-rate neglect: two types of reasoning?. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30: 260-261.
23. De Neys, W. and Schaeken, W. 2007. When people are more logical under cognitive load: Dual task impact on scalar implicature. Experimental Psychology, 54: 128-133.
24. De Neys, W., Schaeken, W. and d'Ydewalle, G. 2005. Working memory and everyday conditional reasoning: Retrieval and inhibition of stored counterexamples. Thinking & Reasoning, 11: 349-381.
25. De Neys, W. and Verschueren, N. 2006. Working memory capacity and a notorious brain teaser: The case of the Monty Hall Dilemma. Experimental Psychology, 53: 123-131.
26. Eddy, D. M. 1982. "Probabilistic reasoning in clinical medicine: Problems and opportunities". In Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases, Edited by: Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. 153-160. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
27. Evans, J. and St., B. T. 2003. In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10: 454-459.
28. Evans, J. and St., B. T. 2006. The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 13: 378-395.
29. Evans, J. and St., B. T. 2008. Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment and social cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59: 255-278.
30. Evans, J., St., B. T., Handley, S. J., Perham, N., Over, D. E. and Thompson, V. A. 2000. Frequency versus probability formats in statistical word problems. Cognition, 77: 197-213.
31. Fenton, N. and Neil, M. 2010. Comparing risks of alternative medical diagnosis using Bayesian arguments. Journal of Biomedical Informatics, 43: 485-495.
32. Fiedler, K. 1988. The dependence of the conjunction fallacy on subtle linguistic factors. Psychological Research, 50: 123-129.
33. Fiedler, K., Brinkmann, B., Betsch, T. and Wild, B. 2000. A sampling approach to biases in conditional probability judgments: Beyond base rate neglect and statistical format. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129: 399-418.
34. Fodor, J. A. 1983. The modularity of mind: An essay on faculty psychology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
35. Frederick, S. 2005. Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19: 25-42.
36. Garcia-Retamero, R. and Galesic, M. 2010. Who profits from visual aids: Overcoming challenges in people's understanding of risks. Social Science and Medicine, 70: 1019-1025.
37. Gathercole, S. E. 1999. Cognitive approaches to the development of short-term memory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11: 410-419.
38. Gathercole, S. E., Pickering, S. J., Ambridge, B. and Wearing, H. 2004. The structure of working memory from 4 to 15 years of age. Developmental Psychology, 40: 177-190.
39. Gigerenzer, G. 1994. "Why the distinction between single-event probabilities and frequencies is important for psychology (and vice versa)". In Subjective probability, Edited by: Wright, G. and Ayton, P. 129-162. Chichester, UK: Wiley.
40. Gigerenzer, G. and Hoffrage, U. 1995. How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats. Psychological Review, 102: 684-704.
41. Gould, S. J. and Lewontin, R. C. 1979. The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A critique of the adaptationist programme. Proceedings of the Royal Academy of London, 205: 581-598.
42. Hoffrage, U., Lindsey, S., Hertwig, R. and Gigerenzer, G. 2000. Medicine: Communicating statistical information. Science, 290: 2261-2262.
43. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. 1973. On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80: 237-251.
44. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. 1996. On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological Review, 103: 283-291.
45. Kassin, S. M. 1979. Base rates and prediction: The role of sample size. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 5: 210-213.
46. Kleiter, G. D. 1994. "Natural sampling-Rationality without base rates". In Contributions to mathematical psychology, psychometrics and methodology, Edited by: Fischer, G. H. J. and Lambell, N. 375-388. New York: Springer.
47. Laplace, P. S. 1902. A philosophical essay on probabilities, New York: Drummond.
48. Lloyd, A. J. 2001. Communicating and understanding risk: The extent of patients' understanding of the risk of treatments. Quality in Health Care, 10(Supplement1): i14-i18.
49. Lyon, D. and Slovic, P. 1976. Dominance of accuracy information and neglect of base rates in probability estimation. Acta Psychologica, 40: 287-298.
50. Marr, D. 1982. Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and processing of visual information, San Francisco: Freeman.
51. Meehl, P. E. and Rosen, A. 1955. Antecedent probability and the efficacy of psychometric signs, patterns or cutting scores. Psychological Bulletin, 52: 194-216.
52. Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Rettinger, D. A., Shah, P. and Hegarty, M. 2001. How are visuospatial working memory, executive functioning, and spatial abilities related? A latent variable analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 130: 621-640. General
53. Moor, B. G., Güroǧlu, B., Op de Macks, Z. A., Rombouts, S. A., Van der Molen, M. W. and Crone, E. A. 2012. Social exclusion and punishment of excluders: neural correlates and developmental trajectories. Neuroimage, 59: 708-717.
54. Neace, W. P., Michaud, S., Bolling, L., Deer, K. and Zecevic, L. 2008. Frequency formats, probability formats, or problem structure? A test of the nested-sets hypothesis in an extensional task. Judgment and Decision Making, 3: 140-152.
55. Over, D. E. 2007. The logic of natural sampling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30: 277
56. Sloman, S. and Over, D. E. 2003. "Probability judgment from the inside out". In Evolution and the psychology of thinking: The debate, Edited by: Over, D. E. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
57. Sloman, S. A. 1996. The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119: 3-22.
58. Sloman, S. A., Over, D., Slovak, L. and Stibel, J. M. 2003. Frequency illusions and other fallacies. Organisational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 91: 296-309.
59. Stanovich, K. E. 1999. Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.
60. Stanovich, K. E. and West, R. F. 2008. On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94: 672-695.
61. Toplak, M. E., West, R. F. and Stanovich, K. E. 2011. The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks. Memory and Cognition, 39: 1275-1289.
62. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. 1974. Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 4157: 185, 1124-1131.
63. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. 1982. "Evidential impact of base rates". In Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases, Edited by: Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. 153-160. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
64. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. 1983. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90: 293-315.
65. van den Bos, W., Westenberg, M., van Dijk, E. and Crone, E.A. 2010. Development of trust and reciprocity in adolescence. Cognitive Development, 25: 90-102.
66. Van Lier, J., Revlin, R. and De Neys, W. 2012. Detecting cheaters without thinking: Testing the automaticity of the cheater detection module Manuscript submitted for publication
67. Verschueren, N., Schaeken, W. and d'Ydewalle, G. Everyday conditional reasoning with working memory preload. Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.
68. Yamagishi, K. 2003. Facilitating normative judgments of conditional probability: Frequency or nested sets?. Experimental Psychology, 50: 97-106.
69. Zhu, L. and Gigerenzer, G. 2006. Children can solve Bayesian problems: The role of representation in mental computation. Cognition, 98: 287-308.