Reducing cognitive biases in probabilistic reasoning by the use of logarithm formats

Cognition

Volumn 120, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 248-267

  Juslin, Peter ^a   Nilsson, Håkan ^a   Winman, Anders ^a   Lindskog, Marcus ^a  

^a UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Base rate neglect; Linear models; Probability judgment

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ANALYTIC METHOD; ARTICLE; BAYESIAN LEARNING; COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; FEEDBACK SYSTEM; FEMALE; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; LEARNING; MALE; MEMORY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; TASK PERFORMANCE;

ADULT; COGNITION; FEMALE; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MALE; PROBABILITY LEARNING; PROBLEM SOLVING;

EID: 79959232101     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: 18737838     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.05.004     Document Type: Article

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