Uncertain deduction and conditional reasoning

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 6, Issue MAR, 2015, Pages

  Evans, Jonathan St B T ^a   Thompson, V A ^b   Over, David E ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN   (Canada)

^c DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Coherence; Conditional reasoning; Explicit inference; Fallacy; New paradigm psychology of reasoning; p validity; Uncertain premises

Indexed keywords

EID: 84926635123     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00398     Document Type: Article

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