Now you Bayes, now you don’t: effects of set-problem and frequency-format mental representations on statistical reasoning

Psychonomic Bulletin and Review

Volumn 22, Issue 5, 2015, Pages 1465-1473

  Sirota, Miroslav ^a   Kostovičová, Lenka ^b   Vallée Tourangeau, Frédéric ^a  

^a KINGSTON UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b Institute of Experimental Psychology Slovak Academy of Sciences   (Slovakia)

Author keywords

Bayesian reasoning; Chances; Format mental representation; Natural frequencies; Problem mental representation

Indexed keywords

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; BAYES THEOREM; COMPREHENSION; FEMALE; HUMAN; LEARNING; MALE; PATTERN RECOGNITION; PHYSIOLOGY; PROBLEM SOLVING; RANDOMIZATION; REPETITION PRIMING; YOUNG ADULT;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; BAYES THEOREM; COMPREHENSION; FEMALE; HUMANS; MALE; PATTERN RECOGNITION, VISUAL; PROBABILITY LEARNING; PROBLEM SOLVING; RANDOM ALLOCATION; REPETITION PRIMING; SET (PSYCHOLOGY); TRANSFER (PSYCHOLOGY); YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84942363090     PISSN: 10699384     EISSN: 15315320     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/s13423-015-0810-y     Document Type: Article

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