Is the mind Bayesian? The case for agnosticism

Mind and Society

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 1-38

  Baratgin, Jean ^a   Politzer, Guy ^b  

^a AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITY   (France)

^b CNRS   (France)

Author keywords

Bayesian coherence; Linguistic pragmatics; Probability judgment; Probability revising; Probability updating; Subjective Bayesianism

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746168149     PISSN: 15937879     EISSN: 18601839     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11299-006-0007-1     Document Type: Article

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