Computational features vs frequentist phrasing in the base-rate fallacy

Swiss Journal of Psychology

Volumn 57, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 79-85

  Macchi, Laura ^a   Mosconi, Giuseppe ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MILAN   (Italy)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Base rate fallacy; Bayesian reasoning; Computational features; Frequentist phrasing

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032387202     PISSN: 14210185     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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