The 'whys' and 'whens' of individual differences in thinking biases

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 172-178

  De Neys, Wim ^a,b,c   Bonnefon, Jean François ^a,d  

^a CNRS   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS DESCARTES   (France)

^c UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

^d UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COGNITIVE SYSTEMS;

HUMAN THINKING; INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES; INDIVIDUAL VARIANCES; REASONERS; REASONING PROCESS; TIME POINTS;

BIOLOGY;

COGNITION; EXECUTIVE FUNCTION; HUMAN; INTROSPECTION; KNOWLEDGE; MOTIVATION; REVIEW; TASK PERFORMANCE; THINKING;

EID: 84875812626     PISSN: 13646613     EISSN: 1879307X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.02.001     Document Type: Review

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