Updating: A psychologically basic situation of probability revision

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 253-287

  Baratgin, Jean ^a   Politzer, Guy ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 8   (France)

Author keywords

Bayes' rule; Focusing; Probability revision; Updating

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649828354     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2010.519564     Document Type: Article

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