How to improve Bayesian reasoning: Comment on Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995)

Psychological Review

Volumn 106, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 417-424

  Mellers, Barbara A ^a   McGraw, A Peter ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006606368     PISSN: 0033295X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0033-295X.106.2.417     Document Type: Review

References (15)

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15. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional vs. intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315.