Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 54-77

  Stupple, Edward J N ^a   Ball, Linden J ^b,c   Ellis, Daniel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DERBY   (United Kingdom)

^b LANCASTER UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL LANCASHIRE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Deduction; Dual process theory; Individual differences; Matching bias; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84876112275     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2012.735622     Document Type: Article

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