The inverse fallacy: An account of deviations from Bayes's theorem and the additivity principle

Memory and Cognition

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 171-178

  Villejoubert, Gaëlle ^a   Mandel, David R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHM; ARTICLE; BAYES THEOREM; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS; THEORY;

EID: 0036268658     PISSN: 0090502X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/BF03195278     Document Type: Article

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