Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning

Psychological Review

Volumn 106, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 62-88

  Johnson Laird, P N ^a   Girotto, Vittorio ^c   Legrenzi, Paolo ^b   Legrenzi, Maria Sonino ^d   Caverni, Jean Paul ^c  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MILAN   (Italy)

^c AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITY   (France)

^d UNIVERSITY OF PADOVA   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; SYSTEM ANALYSIS;

COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; HUMANS; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PROBABILITY THEORY;

EID: 0032611313     PISSN: 0033295X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62     Document Type: Article

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