Good fences make for good neighbors but bad science: A review of what improves Bayesian reasoning and why

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 6, Issue MAR, 2015, Pages

  Brase, Gary L ^a   Hill, W Trey ^b  

^a KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FORT HAYS STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian reasoning; Ecological rationality; Frequencies; Heuristics and biases; Numeracy; Pictorial aids; Probabilities

Indexed keywords

EID: 84926633556     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00340     Document Type: Review

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