Reasoning and choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD): Implications for improving Bayesian reasoning

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 6, Issue MAR, 2015, Pages

  Tubau, Elisabet ^a   Aguilar Lleyda, David ^a   Johnson, Eric D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Bayesian reasoning; Choice biases; Cognitive illusions; Monty hall dilemma; Reflection

Indexed keywords

EID: 84926685375     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00353     Document Type: Article

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