Toward an ecological analysis of Bayesian inferences: how task characteristics influence responses

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 6, Issue , 2015, Pages

  Hafenbrädl, Sebastian ^a   Hoffrage, Ulrich ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

base rate; Bayesian inference; ecological analysis; natural frequencies; representation format; signal detection; task characteristics; updating beliefs

Indexed keywords

EID: 84947289867     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00939     Document Type: Article

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