Is the human mind definitely not Bayesian? A review of the various arguments

Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive

Volumn 21, Issue 6, 2002, Pages 653-680

  Baratgin, Jean ^a  

^a AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITY   (France)

Author keywords

Bayesian theory; Probabilistic reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041764477     PISSN: 02499185     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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