Beyond getting the numbers right: What does it mean to be a "successful" Bayesian reasoner?

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 6, Issue JUN, 2015, Pages

  Vallée Tourangeau, Gaëlle ^a   Sirota, Miroslav ^a   Juanchich, Marie ^a   Vallée Tourangeau, Frédéric ^a  

^a KINGSTON UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bayesian inference; Cognitive processes; Insight problem solving; Judgment and decision making; Performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 84940497192     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00712     Document Type: Note

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