Corporate governance and equity prices

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 118, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 107-155

  Gompers, Paul ^a   Ishii, Joy ^a   Metrick, Andrew ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037332214     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/00335530360535162     Document Type: Review

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