A survey of corporate governance

Journal of Finance

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 737-783

  Shleifer, Andrei ^a   Vishny, Robert W ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001026456     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x     Document Type: Article

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