The motivation and impact of pension fund activism

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 52, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 293-340

  Guercio, Diane Del ^a   Hawkins, Jennifer ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OREGON   (United States)

^b Hawkins Pound Consulting   (United States)

Author keywords

Control activity; Corporate governance; G23; G34; Pension funds; Proxy contest; Shareholder activism

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042377866     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00011-2     Document Type: Article

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