Undoing the powerful anti-takeover force of staggered boards

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 274-288

  Guo, Re Jin ^a   Kruse, Timothy A ^b   Nohel, Tom ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO   (United States)

^b XAVIER UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Classified board of directors; Corporate governance; Shareholder activism; Staggered board of directors

Indexed keywords

EID: 44649133185     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.007     Document Type: Article

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