Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 99, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 11-26

  Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger ^a   Stulz, René M ^b,c,d  

^a EPFL   (Switzerland)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^d European Corporate Governance Institute   (Belgium)

Author keywords

CEO compensation; CEO incentives; Financial crisis; Insider trading

Indexed keywords

EID: 78149496813     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.010     Document Type: Article

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