The state of corporate governance research

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 939-961

  Bebchuk, Lucian A ^a   Weisbach, Michael S ^b  

^a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951213226     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhp121     Document Type: Article

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