Cleaning house or jumping ship? Understanding board upheaval following financial fraud

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 35, Issue 6, 2014, Pages 926-937

  Marcel, Jeremy J ^a   Cowen, Amanda P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

director turnover; fraud; governance failure; organizational legitimacy; stigma management

Indexed keywords

DIGITAL STORAGE; REPAIR;

DIRECTOR TURNOVER; ELEVATED LEVEL; FINANCIAL FRAUD; FRAUD; ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMACY;

CRIME;

EID: 84900514758     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2126     Document Type: Review

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