Entrepreneurial shareholder activism: Hedge funds and other private investors

Journal of Finance

Volumn 64, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 187-229

  Klein, April ^a   Zur, Emanuel ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58849146609     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01432.x     Document Type: Article

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