Shareholder activism and CEO pay

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 535-592

  Ertimur, Yonca ^a   Ferri, Fabrizio ^b   Muslu, Volkan ^c  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79251524954     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhq113     Document Type: Article

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