Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review

Journal of Management

Volumn 40, Issue 5, 2014, Pages 1230-1268

  Goranova, Maria ^a   Ryan, Lori Verstegen ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MILWAUKEE   (United States)

^b SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

financial activism; multidisciplinary review; shareholder activism; social activism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84901713096     PISSN: 01492063     EISSN: 15571211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0149206313515519     Document Type: Review

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