Sociopolitical dynamics in relations between top managers and security analysts: Favor rendering, reciprocity, and analyst stock recommendations

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 51, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 873-897

  Westphal, James D ^a   Clement, Michael B ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 56649107890     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2008.34789647     Document Type: Article

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