Corporate governance

Econometrica

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 1-35

  Tirole, Jean ^a  

^a Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

Author keywords

Control rights; Governance; Managerial incentives; Shareholder value; Stakeholder society

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002424013     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00177     Document Type: Article

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