The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: Dimensions and determinants

Academy of Management Review

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 447-465

  Aguilera, Ruth V ^a   Jackson, Gregory ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b TRADE AND INDUSTRY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038711743     PISSN: 03637425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/AMR.2003.10196772     Document Type: Article

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