Quo Vadis? Suggestions for future corporate governance research

Journal of Management and Governance

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 153-169

  Tosi Jr , Henry L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Managerial capitalism; Personality; Research methods

Indexed keywords

EID: 46749135115     PISSN: 13853457     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10997-008-9054-9     Document Type: Conference Paper

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