Incentives to cheat: The influence of executive compensation and firm performance on financial misrepresentation

Organization Science

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 350-367

  Harris, Jared ^a   Bromiley, Philip ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral theory; Corporate misconduct; Executive compensation; Relative performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 35748949788     PISSN: 10477039     EISSN: 15265455     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1060.0241     Document Type: Article

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