Extreme governance: An analysis of dual-class firms in the United States

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 1051-1088

  Gompers, Paul A ^a   Ishii, Joy ^b   Metrick, Andrew ^c  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c YALE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951216878     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhp024     Document Type: Article

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