Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest European companies

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 21, Issue 6, 2000, Pages 689-705

  Thomsen, Steen ^a   Pedersen, Torben ^b  

^a AARHUS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS   (Denmark)

^b Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Europe; Ownership structure; Performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000251280     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(200006)21:6<689::AID-SMJ115>3.0.CO;2-Y     Document Type: Article

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