Managers and analysts: An examination of mutual influence

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 57, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 849-868

  Washburn, Mark ^a   Bromiley, Philip ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84898888202     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amj.2011.0420     Document Type: Article

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