Stakeholder rights and corporate governance: A cross-national study of hostile takeovers

Administrative Science Quarterly

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 263-295

  Schneper, William D ^a   Guillén, Mauro F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 12744255449     PISSN: 00018392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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