Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500

Journal of Finance

Volumn 58, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 1301-1327

  Anderson, Ronald C ^a   Reeb, David M ^b  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0142219280     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00567     Document Type: Article

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