The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 167-188

  Renneboog, Luc ^a   Szilagyi, Peter G ^b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Sample selection; Shareholder activism; Shareholder proposals

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649943148     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.10.002     Document Type: Article

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