Returns to shareholder activism: Evidence from a clinical study of the hermes UK focus fund

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 3093-3129

  Becht, Marco ^a   Franks, Julian ^b   Mayer, Colin ^c   Rossi, Stefano ^d  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

^b LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^d STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951251153     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn054.ra     Document Type: Article

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